antlion-lacewing - v2.0.1
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    Boundaries

    Lacewing checks the token: signed by the issuer, unexpired, meant for this API. Antlion checks that whoever sent it holds the key it is bound to, and that the proof was made for this request. Your Lacewing profile is passed in unchanged; Antlion adds refusals and removes none.

    • The headers. Exactly one Authorization: DPoP and exactly one DPoP. A second copy of either is refused, and so is the Bearer scheme. Two headers joined by Headers into one value are caught, because a compact JWS never contains a comma.
    • The proof. typ is dpop+jwt, alg is on the allowlist and matches the key's type and curve, and a key with private members is refused. The signature is checked against the key in the proof header, which is the only place in the package that key is used.
    • The request. htm equals the method. htu equals the configured origin plus the request path, normalised per RFC 3986, without query or fragment. ath is the SHA-256 of the token string presented, and is always required.
    • The binding. The RFC 7638 thumbprint of the proof key, computed by jose and never read from input, equals the token's cnf.jkt. A token with no cnf.jkt is refused.
    • Freshness and replay. See Deployment for the window, nonces and the stores.
    Not in Antlion Where it goes
    Verifying the access token Your Lacewing profile
    Creating proofs, retrying on a nonce challenge oauth4webapi or openid-client
    Issuing bound tokens, dpop_jkt, PAR, PKCE, binding refresh tokens The authorization server (oidc-provider, Keycloak, Curity)
    Bearer on a DPoP route A second route with a plain Lacewing profile
    Working out the request URL The origin option; Host and X-Forwarded-* are never read
    The Redis or Postgres connection Your client (ioredis, node-redis, pg), passed to the store
    Creating the Postgres table, deleting expired rows Your migrations and your scheduler, calling deleteExpired()
    Keeping replay keys through a failover Postgres with synchronous replication; Redis can't
    mTLS (RFC 8705) Not supported
    Opaque tokens and introspection Not supported in v1
    A compromised client signing fresh proofs The client: non-extractable WebCrypto keys, a CSP
    Rate-limiting bad proofs Your edge or gateway

    Antlion also does no logging, reads no process.env, does no work at import time and uses no node: imports. Hashing uses globalThis.crypto.