Checked against oauth4webapi 3.8.8, openid-client 6.8.8 and
oidc-provider 9.12.2 in September 2026. Option names move between majors,
so check your versions before copying one.
| Role | Job | Package |
|---|---|---|
| Authorization server | Log the user in, issue an at+jwt with cnf.jkt, handle PAR and PKCE |
oidc-provider |
| Client | Hold the key, sign a proof per request, answer a nonce challenge | openid-client (or oauth4webapi underneath it) |
| Resource server | Check the token, the proof, and that they belong together | Lacewing + Antlion |
oidc-providerfeatures.dPoP, and features.fapi with profile: "2.0". The
FAPI profile brings PAR and PKCE with it.oidc-provider issues opaque tokens unless
features.resourceIndicators.getResourceServerInfo returns
accessTokenFormat: "jwt" for your API, and Antlion only reads JWTs. The
default getResourceServerInfo throws until you write one.enabledJWA.dPoPSigningAlgValues defaults to ES256, Ed25519 and
EdDSA. Add PS256 if your clients use RSA keys, and nothing else.features.dPoP.nonceSecret and requireNonce govern the token endpoint
only. Your API's nonces use a separate secret, and clients handle the two
independently.openid-clientkeyPair = generateKeyPair("ES256") non-extractable by default
dpop = getDPoPHandle(config, keyPair)
token = authorization code grant, with DPoP: dpop
data = fetchProtectedResource(config, token, url, method, ..., { DPoP: dpop })
fetchProtectedResource retries once when your API answers
use_dpop_nonce, so turning nonces on costs the client a round trip and
no code.Ed25519, not EdDSA: oauth4webapi writes the RFC
9864 name. Antlion accepts both names for an Ed25519 key.url the client fetches is the htu it signs. Your origin plus the
path has to produce the same string.accessToken = Lacewing access-token profile
issuer: the oidc-provider issuer
audience: the resource indicator the client asked for
keys: the issuer's jwks_uri, with your cache TTL, cooldown and timeout
algorithms: the ones the issuer signs access tokens with
dpop = Antlion profile
token: accessToken
origin: the public origin clients call, as a URL parser prints it
replay: a shared store once there is more than one node
nonce: "required" (with nonceSecrets) | "off"
The proof algorithms are Antlion's FAPI set and are not configured.
| Thing | Set in | Must match |
|---|---|---|
| Token format | getResourceServerInfo |
"jwt", or Antlion refuses every token |
| Audience | the resource indicator | Lacewing's audience |
| Proof algorithms | dPoPSigningAlgValues and the client's key |
PS256, ES256, Ed25519 as EdDSA or Ed25519 |
htu |
the url the client fetches |
Antlion's origin plus the path |
| Nonces | each server separately | nothing; they are independent |
oauth4webapi insteadoauth4webapi's validateJwtAccessToken does the binding correctly:
cnf.jkt is compared against the proof key's thumbprint, ath is
required, htm is exact, and a bound token under Bearer is refused. If
you are not on Lacewing, use it and skip Antlion.
Where the two differ, as of 3.8.8:
| Behaviour | validateJwtAccessToken |
Antlion |
|---|---|---|
A Bearer token with no cnf |
accepted, unless requireDPoP: true |
refused |
Proof jti replay |
checked to be a string, not recorded | recorded once in a store you supply |
| Server nonces | not checked; the docs say to check them afterwards | checked, when on |
htu compared against |
request.url |
the configured origin plus the path |
| Proof age | 300 seconds either side of now, fixed | a window you size, under a cap |
| Default proof algorithms | includes RS256/384/512 and ML-DSA |
the FAPI set only |
| Access token verified by | its own validator, from the issuer's metadata | your Lacewing profile |
Each left-hand row can be closed from outside: requireDPoP: true, a
signingAlgorithms list, a jti store and a nonce check after the call,
and a Request whose url you built from your public origin rather than
the Host header.
Don't run both on the same route. When they disagree about a request you end up debugging the difference between them.